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Pearl A. Drego

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# Paradigms and Models of Ego States

Pearl A. Dreger

## Abstract

The development of the ego state paradigm (Berne, 1947/1968, 1957b/1977) marked the birth of transactional analysis. In this article, Berne's (1961, 1963) four principles of diagnosis are the basis of a schema that highlights the underlying unity of his definitions, diagrams, and case studies of ego states. Using Kuhn's (1970) approach to science, an analysis of Berne's cowpoke story (1957a/1977, 1957b/1977, 1961, 1963), and textual criticism of Bernian literature, the basics of ego state theory are schematized into four paradigms that give methodological consistency to structural analysis and help to classify ego state diagrams.

## The Search for Order

After visiting a slum that had been devastated, several TA trainees discussed their reactions in terms of ego states. One woman said she felt deep compassion and concern in her Adult; another said that was not possible because concern for others' distress has to be Nurturing Parent. A third trainee insisted that the first woman must have been in her Child ego state because all feelings are in the Child and such a scene would undoubtedly have triggered archaic reactions. As they talked, the trainees realized that the diagnosis of ego states cannot be absolutely falsified or verified. It became clear that the problem was not just one of diagnosis; rather, it related to the very concept of ego states and the framework that lay behind the diagnosis, that is, what criteria were used to separate Parent from Adult, Adult from Child, and so on.

This article addresses these issues by highlighting four criteria or paradigms of ego states that take their names from Berne's (1961, 1963) four principles of diagnosis.

## Paradigms and Models

*Paradigm as Commitment.* Kuhn (1970) employed the word paradigm in several ways. First, a paradigm is a scientific achievement with two characteristics: It is "sufficiently unprecedented as to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity," and "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 10). For Kuhn, the development of a new paradigm constitutes "normal science," which contains "some accepted examples of actual scientific practice" that in turn "provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (p. 10).

The new scientific achievement leads a group of people to make a professional commitment to the new paradigm. However, this commitment is not fully rational; rather, it is based on a feeling that the new ideas are right. This leads to a set of further commitments that are conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 10, 42), including commitments to heuristic and ontological models. The changeover is more of a conversion experience than deduced logic. Kuhn (pp. 10, 204) compared it to the kind of gestalt switch that is at the heart of revolutionary leaps in science. The switch enables a new set of symbolic generalizations, models, and values to emerge.

With the discovery of three ego states, transactional analysis or Bernian psychotherapy emerged as a paradigm that involved a gestalt switch from psychoanalysis (Dreger, 1979, p. 6). In this sense of paradigm, the matrix of Bernian theory, organizations of TA practitioners, TA 101s, journals, newsletters, classical literature, official libraries, examinations, and conferences constitute a paradigm. "A paradigm is what members of a scientific com-

munity share, and, conversely a scientific community consists of persons who share a paradigm" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 176). Thus, the entire theory and technology of TA with its cadres of TA practitioners constitute a paradigm.

*Paradigm as Exemplar and Pattern.* In another sense, paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) refers to the *exemplars* or main problem-solution examples and instances of successful practice that make a given science what it is. For example, verb conjugations are paradigms by which similar verbs may be conjugated (Kuhn, 1977). Berne (1964) also used the word paradigm in this sense, that is, to mean prototype. He stated that paradigms refer to the "critical transaction or transactions at the social and psychological levels" (p. 70). The seminal insights of the cowpoke story (Berne, 1957a/1977, 1957b/1977, 1961, 1963) and textual criticism of Bernian literature yield four such paradigms. These paradigms help to schematize ego state theory and interpret ego state diagrams, thus maintaining TA as a consistent science.

*Models.* Models organize certain aspects of experience into systems and subsystems that can then be considered as wholes rather than as parts. Derived from theory, models throw further light on that theory, pointing back to the moment of insight and to the paradigms that gave them birth. Models highlight the ingredients of paradigms by showing the spectrum of possibilities that derive from the paradigm (Drego, 1979). However, the existence of a model does not prejudice the existence or nonexistence of what it represents.

There are various kinds of models. Scale models (such as those of ships) partially identify properties, analog models (such as those of an atom) represent structure, and theoretical models provide a linguistic means of bridging the gap between the known and the unknown.

Max Black (1962) described an analog model as some material object, system, or process designed to reproduce as faithfully as possible in some new medium the structure or web of relationship in an original. We do not ask the question of a model, "Is it absolutely certain?" (p. 222)

In this article, paradigm usually refers to the prototypical patterns contained in the historical exemplar; model refers to theoretical designs emerging from the paradigm that mediate between the paradigm and reality. A paradigm is

a prototype that does not need to prove its validity; it remains part of the given epistemological commitments of a science and is not subject to the principle of falsifiability. A model is derived from a paradigm, it can be modified over time, and it can be selectively one-sided in emphasizing certain aspects of a paradigm. Elements of a model may or may not be falsified or given other explanations. Model is used here in a different sense than it has been used before in relation to ego state diagrams (Summerton, 1981, p. 151).


### The Transactional Analytic Paradigm

The development of the ego state theory of personality marked the birth of transactional analysis and remained central to the new science (Berne, 1972). Its source is epitomized by the cowpoke story, the case study of a Nevada lawyer.

An 8-year-old boy vacationing on a ranch in his cowboy suit helped the hired man to unsaddle his horse. When they were finished, the hired man said, "Thanks, cowpoke!" To which his assistant answered: "I'm not really a cowpoke; I'm just a little boy."

The man who told this story remarked: "That's just the way I feel. I'm not really a lawyer; I'm just a little boy." Away from the psychiatrist's office, he was an effective and successful courtroom lawyer of high repute. He reared his family decently, did a lot of community work, and was popular socially. But in the psychiatrist's office he often did have the attitude of a little boy. Thus it was clear . . . that at certain times he behaved like a grown-up lawyer and at other times like a child. . . . It was soon possible to speak familiarly of these two attitudes as the Adult and the Child. It then appeared further that in his community work he was neither rational (Adult), as he was in the courtroom, nor lonely and apprehensive (Child) as he often was in the psychiatrist's office; rather he was inclined to feel emotionally involved with the downtrodden; sympathetic, philanthropic and helpful. And he recognized this as a duplication of his father's attitude; hence, it was doubly easy for him to accept the idea of calling this state of

Table 1  
Toward a Taxonomy of Ego States



mind "parental." (Berne, 1963, pp. 131-132)

In earlier versions of the cowpoke story, Berne (1957b/1977) mentioned that it took a year to discover the Parent ego state, which had less autonomous quality than the other ego states (Berne, 1971) although all were contemporary.

There were three different aspects apparent in his handling of money. The Child was penurious to the penny and had miserly ways of ensuring penny-wise prosperity. . . . He would gleefully steal chewing gum and other small items out of the drug store, just as he had done as a child. The Adult handled large sums with a banker's shrewdness, foresight and success, and was willing to spend money to make money. But another side of him had fantasies of giving it all away for the good of the community. . . . He did donate large sums of money to charity with the same sentimental benevolence as his father. As the philanthropic glow wore off, the child would take over with vindictive resentfulness toward his beneficiaries, followed by the Adult who would wonder why on earth he wanted to risk his solvency for such sentimental reasons. (Berne, 1961, pp. 33-34)

Berne's discovery was that the little boy on the couch, the case-winning courtroom attorney, and the generous philanthropist were not just three different behaviors manifested by

one person, but also three different ego states. The cowpoke story is the paradigmatic exemplar for personality structure and dynamics (Drego, 1979) because it expresses the gestalt switch or the moment of insight that revealed the Child self as a unified structure, accessible to dialogue and amenable to radical change of boundary and content.

In the psychoanalytic paradigm, Berne (1947/1968, p. 87) answered the question "Who is 'I'?" by describing the self as the ego and the ego as having three parts—one of parental images, one grown-up part that uses the reality principle, and a little girl or little boy. He treated each of these as a different self within the ego (pp. 87-88). This left the problem of "who is the 'driver,' for whose benefit the Id, the Ego, and the Superego maintain their nice balance" (Berne, 1947/1968, p. 89). Although he avoided the ontological problem of the Self, it appears as though the driver + Id, the driver + Ego, and the driver + Superego were Berne's prototypes of the three ego states as active agents of personality.

In later developments of his theory, Berne (1947/1968) put the psychoanalytic drive hypothesis into three active agents. The id that could not learn, think, and grow (p. 78) led to the Child ego state that can learn, think, and grow. The ego—with the three tasks of "relieving libido, relieving mortido, and reducing the threat of the outside world" (p. 81), "which can look at itself, much as the parts of the body can feel one other" (p. 87)—became the Adult


**Table 2**  
**Basis of Structural Analysis**  
 (Drego, 1977, p. 70)

<b>Theoretical basis for</b> ----->	<b>States of consciousness</b>	<b>Assumed psychological mechanism for</b> -----<		
Praematic Absolutes	Hypotheses	Phenomena	Organizers or Psychic organs	Determinants
That every grown-up individual was once a child.	That relics of childhood survive into later life as complete ego states.	Child ego states	Archaeopsyche	Id internal programming from indigenous biological forces
That every human with sufficient functioning brain-tissues is potentially capable of adequate reality-testing.	That reality-testing is a function of discrete ego states, and not an isolated capacity.	Adult ego states	Neopsyche	Ego - probability programming arising from autonomous data processing based on past experience.
That every individual who survives into adult life has had either functioning parents or someone in loco parentis.	That the executive may be taken over by the complete ego state of another individual.	Parent ego states	Exteropsyche	Superego - external programming arising from incorporated external canons

ego state, described as a computerized decision maker. The concepts of superego and ego ideal, the theory of the libido turning in on itself to protect and punish, and the incorporation of heavily charged images of parents (pp. 85-86) became the Parent ego state.

*Toward a Taxonomy.* The cowpoke story—the primary paradigm in the development of ego state theory—yields a schema composed of four dimensions that are matched by four definitions that Berne gave of ego states. Each dimension, with its definition, is a paradigm for working with Ego states and, in turn, is matched with models or diagrams of ego states that occur in Berne's writings. The four paradigms are the experiential, the biographical, the metaphorical, and the transactional or relational. The four kinds of models derived from the paradigms are phenomenological, historical, behavioral, and social models (Table 1).

The paradigms are not the same as the four principles, but they give the diagnostic process a methodological framework. The four prin-



**Figure 1**  
**Berne's Structural Diagram**  
 (Berne, 1964, p. 25)

ciples of diagnosis are used to identify a particular ego state of a particular person. The four paradigms are used to find criteria for the theoretical differentiation of one ego state from another, for example, what differentiates Parent

from Adult. The four kinds of models bring data design and diagramming protocols to a client's therapeutic journey and to the therapist-client relationship.

*Method and Conditions of Discovery.* The ego state paradigm was discovered through the introspection and historical memory of the client and the logic and intuition of the therapist. An ego state was regarded as a normal physiological experience, "described phenomenologically as a coherent system of feelings, and operationally as a set of coherent behavior patterns. In more practical terms, it is a system of feelings accompanied by a related set of behavior patterns" (Berne, 1964, p. 23). This is shown in Figure 1, which this article treats as Berne's structural diagram of the reality of ego states, namely "a diagram of the complete personality of any individual" (p. 24). The three circles are Berne's structural model, but this does not mean that ego states themselves are models.

Berne (1961) saw himself as "following in the footsteps of two of the most remarkable of his teachers (Penfield and Federn)" (p. 20). Penfield's experiments on neurological mechanisms enabled a client to reexperience the past as a present phenomenon and led Kubie to talk about the patient as both observer and observed (p. 18). This medical distinction—together with Federn's (1953) psychoanalytic concept of ego-feeling (by which he meant "the ego's own perception of itself" [p. 60]) and Weiss's distinction between "the residual infantile ego state of the adult person," (cited in Berne, 1961, p. 19) and the current ego state—made way for the gestalt switch represented by TA, in which the client's Adult ego state is an agent for cure. As did Federn, Berne used the term ego state to include the reality of bodily feeling, mental feeling, and lived-through events (Berne, 1961, pp. 18-19).

Table 2 (Drego, 1977) shows that within the epistemological parameters of his time, Berne gave logical and empirical justification for ego states using pragmatic absolutes, hypotheses, and Freudian concepts to ground them in the actual realities of the human personality. It further shows how subsets of Freudian theory led to the TA paradigm shift.

#### Four Paradigms of Ego State Structure

The *experiential paradigm* shows that the ego


state is experienced phenomenologically by the client: "That's just the way I feel, I'm not really a lawyer, I'm just a little boy" (Berne, 1957b/1977, pp. 121-122). In the cowpoke story, Berne emphasized that the lawyer "could actually perceive, as psychological realities, the three ego states which were in conflict inside of him" (p. 130) and which lived as consistent and separate wholes. The client felt the different realities within himself and was aware of their intrapsychic conversations with each other. Thus treatment was not merely a lesson in the right use of reason, but it led to a purified Adult ego state that included the living experience of a new self.

The *biographical paradigm* gives the history of the ego state. For example, in terms of the cowpoke story, the lawyer's memory of an incident that occurred while he was on vacation at a ranch when he was a specific age and wearing his cowboy suit are biographical confirmations of the Child (Berne, 1957a/1977, p. 99). His philanthropic attitudes (Parent) were actual reflections of the prejudices and exhortations of his pious parents, and his legal and community work (Adult) were part of his own current activities. Thus his personal biography confirmed the distinctions between his ego states.


The *metaphorical paradigm* reflects behavioral manifestations: "The lawyer's attitude really appeared to be more like that of a little boy" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 122). Thus, Child is a metaphor as well as a name for the lawyer's primeval behaviors. His ego states were distinguished by the quality of his conscious behaviors:

One part of his personality faced reality as a whole, the other took it bit by bit and by convenient manipulation, managed to find comfort in distressing situations and anxiety in comforting ones. One part handled reality rationally, the other exploited it in an archaic way. . . . They were both conscious and both belonged to the ego system. (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 100)


The *relational paradigm* focuses on the ego state interacting: "'Are you talking to the lawyer or to the little boy?'" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 122). The lawyer saw his childhood feeling of smallness in relation to the cowboy on the ranch as similar to his feeling of smallness in relation to the therapist in the

**Phenomenological Model of Cowpoke Story** **Historical Model of Cowpoke Story**


The subjective diagnosis is based on self-observation.



The historical diagnosis is made from factual information about the individual's past.

**Behavioral Model of Cowpoke Story**

The behavioral diagnosis is made by observation.

**Social Model of Cowpoke Story**

Those participating in transactions with the agent make the diagnosis on social grounds.

Figure 2  
Ego State Models Derived from the Four Paradigms of the Cowpoke Story  
(Berne, 1963, pp. 132-134)

clinic. Classically called transference, this reproduction of a past relationship in the present helps identify ego states. Berne (1957b/1977) showed how this relationship is crucial for identifying ego state structure:

If the "child" felt threatened or offended, he let the doctor know it through an emotional outburst; if the "adult" was not satisfied, he offered a rational objection or showed a manly indignation; . . . if the "parent's" standards were slighted, he became primly righteous. But the therapist kept in mind always that all three parties would be listening alertly. (p. 129)

Transference thus highlights how important the therapist-client relationship is for cure (Dusay, 1968, p. 277).

These four paradigms are evident throughout Berne's analysis of the ego states discovered in the lawyer and in his record of the process of treatment.

**Four Kinds of Models of Ego State Structure**

The four kinds of models are avenues to the structure of ego states as objective realities which, for Berne (1963), were both intrapsychic and transactional. "From the objective point of view there is a set of integrated behavior patterns; from the subjective point of view there is a corresponding system of feelings; the two together, the behavior and the state of mind, form an active ego state" (p.130).

Several phenomenological models of ego

states can be derived from the cowpoke exemplar (Berne, 1957a/1977, 1961, 1963). One such model is given in Figure 2, which highlights the intrapsychic triad of the three ego states in conflict with each other.

The process of decontamination for the lawyer required phenomenological self-talk by which, for example, his impulsive Child was kept out of trouble by his Adult (oriented to current reality) which thought, "If I were a girl (but I'm not a girl) I wouldn't drink too much (but I don't intend to make remarks about it aloud in any case)" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 126). The lawyer "improved visibly and subjectively because of his real insight" (p. 13) and the ability of his Adult to recognize misperceptions of his own ego states and to deal objectively with his Child and Parent. Although the Parent and Child ego states were constructed from the past, they were amenable to phenomenological change in the present. Berne stated, "Subjectively, the result was an increased feeling of inner harmony" (p. 129); the lawyer could "feel the increasing clarity and confidence of his Adult" (p. 129). The phenomenological diagnosis is therefore made through self-observation.

Figure 2 also gives one of the historical models of the cowpoke exemplar in order to show how Parent and Child origins in the distant past are distinguished from the Adult with its origins in the recent past and its attunement to the present. Historically the Adult develops as a neopsyche, "partly autonomously through the organization of archaic potentialities into new faculties such as logical thinking," whereas the extero-psyche or Parent is composed of elements of the external world incorporated into the internal world (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 133). The archaic Parent, archaic Adult, and archaic Child make further subdivisions in the Child ego state and are identified historically (p. 132). The historical diagnosis is made by reference to facts that can be recalled about the past.

In addition, Figure 2 illustrates one of the several behavioral models of the cowpoke exemplar in which the lawyer exhibited observable behaviors that were typically parental or childlike or grown-up. Other behavioral models were used when Berne (1957b/1977) gave the descriptive aspects of a Child that was "hostile, easily panicked, sexually confused, and afraid

that something would be taken away from him" with the Adult described as "intelligent and realistic" and the Parent as "weak and sentimental" (pp. 128-129). Other behavioral models were used when he discussed the Child's exhibitionism, the Adult's sense of accomplishment, and the Parent's philanthropy (p. 130). The behavioral diagnosis is made by observable factors: The Child is manifested in childlike or archaic attitudes, the Parent by normative attitudes, and the Adult by mature behavior, "accomplishments which are beyond a child, such as accurate analysis of complex realities, and realistic manipulations of concepts" (p. 136).

Figure 2 also gives one of the social models of the cowpoke exemplar in which the little boy in the lawyer speaks out and makes himself known to the doctor. The phenomenological treatment process was situated within and transformed by the therapeutic relationship until the Adult of the lawyer became an ally of the doctor to hasten the process of achieving autonomy (1957b/1977, p. 128). Berne stated that the therapeutic effect of shifting energy in different ego states is "influenced by intrapsychic factors and by external relationships" (p. 134). The social diagnosis was thus made on the basis of interpersonal factors.

The lawyer first made behavioral changes in his family and social life followed by an intrapsychic process of separating his professional Adult from his bisexual Child by a clear boundary, separating his Parental influences from his rational Adult, strengthening his Adult boundaries, and controlling and deconfusing his Child until all three ego states were in harmony. These stages of achieving social control, decontamination, boundary work, and deconfusion generated four methods of diagnosing ego states and utilized four types of ego state models. The following sections of this article detail these models.

### Experiential Paradigm

The experiential paradigm emphasizes the intrapsychic self-knowledge of ego states and the fact that they are not conceptual, but personal. "Thus, regression analysis is a deliberate attempt to shift the study of the Child from an inferential basis to a phenomenological one" (Berne, 1961, p. 227). The lawyer in the primary exemplar had in himself a pressurizing






Figure 3  
From Experiential Paradigm to Phenomenological Models

influence, an independent self, and a confused kid. Each ego state is felt as a self-identity. "Recognizing the Child is one thing, but actually feeling it is another" (p. 227). Each coherent set or system, that is, each ego state, behaved like a person, so that Berne (1970) could say, "Each individual is three different persons, all pulling in different directions," and the three circles "represent the three people that everyone carries around in his or her head" (p. 103).

An ego state in this paradigm is not just a collection of images, such as pictures pasted on canvas, but a living state of the self, with a coherence, a crystallization into a set or web, imbued with feeling (Figure 3). "An 'ego state' may be described phenomenologically as a coherent system of feelings" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 123). "These anomalous attitudes were collected and crystallized into a third ego state which came to be called the 'parent'" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 126).

The Adult ego state is an independent set of feelings, attitudes and behavior patterns that are adapted to the current reality and are not affected by Parental prejudices or archaic attitudes left over from childhood. . . . The Child ego state is a set of feelings, attitudes and behavior patterns that are relics of the individual's own childhood. (Berne, 1963, p. 137)  
The limit of the feeling is the limit of the ego state boundary.

*Phenomenological Models.* Once the experiential criteria for distinguishing ego states have been established, phenomenological models help to simplify the way we speak about ego states. There is a contemporaneous quality about these models. For example, one can experience one's Child in the present without remembering one's childhood. One can talk about the current experiences of big person/inner Child/grown-up, or of voices in the head/adaptations in the voice/the listener, or the hugger/hugged/observer without referring to historical data.

These models distinguish Parent, Adult, and Child as felt realities from the superego, ego, and id as concepts. Berne (1961) diagrammed them separately as "your parents," "the grown-up," and "the kid" so as to emphasize their personalized identities (p. 174) (Figure 3).

In phenomenological models a client has the ability to shift an ego state boundary and also to move cathexis from one belief-feeling system to another. Intrapyschic movements between ego states are diagrammed on phenomenological models, such as Berne's (1972) "PAC Trip Through the Psyche" (p. 250) (Figure 3). This encouraged a new dignity for the client, for "the therapist has a valuable ally in the 'purified adult ego'" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 128).

With phenomenological models one can speak of "my Parent" as a set or network and thus avoid treating the Parent in literal ways,

such as a sum total of people in a person's head. These models focus on integration and maturity within each ego state and sidestep the question of whether the Parent has fixations in the same way that Child traumas are fixated (Massey, 1990, p. 176). They help clients deal with negative messages, delusions, fantasies, and projections intrapsychically, without having to determine from which parental figure they came. Diagrams of ego state structural and functional pathology, of contamination and exclusion, are usually phenomenological models.

Diagrams of the executive self and the real self are also phenomenological models (Berne, 1961, p. 242). "Ego state: A consistent pattern of feeling and experience directly related to a corresponding consistent pattern of behavior" (Berne, 1966, p. 364). Therefore, with phenomenological models, all three ego states have voices, feelings, and ways of thinking and behaving; all three ego states are in process and are constantly developing new configurations and interrelationships with each other, especially if the person is in therapy or training and is changing consciously.

Without these models we get a deterministic view of personality in which Parent and Child are unchangeably fixated and only the Adult ego state is amenable to change. Goulding and Goulding (1979) emphasized that people continue to incorporate Parent and to make changes in Child throughout their lives. Thus, phenomenological models are process models that underscore the contemporary nature of each ego state and highlight the fact that each ego state is like a living organism.

The Edwards (1968, p. 37) diagram, in which  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are shown in the upper circle, can be considered a phenomenological model. Similarly, Barnes (1977, p. 11) diagrammed the Adult in the Parent, the Adult in the Child, and  $A_2$ . These three can be integrated in the Adult self of phenomenological models.

When using a phenomenological model for therapy, a client can freely use as many chairs or cushions as needed for each state. Giving phenomenological adjectives to the inner selves (Berne, 1961, p. 205) is useful for quick contracting (e.g., my client, Hilde, said she had an angry Parent, a sleeping Adult, and a fighting Child; another client, Brenda, said she felt she had an empty Parent, an overactive Adult, and a depressed Child). These models

are useful in therapy to ensure that all three ego states are gratified and kept optimally available for self-actualization. They also help clients using the Parent interview (McNeel, 1976) to enter spontaneously into the phenomenological Parent.


*Case Study Using a Phenomenological Model.* Muniram sat in a chair representing his mother. He felt mother's Child say, "I'm embarrassed to talk about sex, you can ask your father, not me." When he sat in his own Child chair he could feel his mother's anger about sex as though he was angry as well, and he could not get beyond this. His mother's anger about his body seemed to be claws gripping him in his Child ego state. He identified this as  $P_1$  with what felt like "Don't touch" and "Don't acknowledge your body" attitudes on the part of his mother's Child in his  $P_1$ .

Muniram did not need to return to early scenes or use historical memory to proceed with his therapy. Using a phenomenological model, he replaced the old  $P_1$  with a new  $P_1$  and with permissions he felt he needed in  $P_1$ : "You do have a body and your body is okay. I can see your body and you can see it, too; I'm happy and glad about your body. I accept you; I accept your body. You can feel your body and enjoy through your body." He could still feel his mother's embarrassment in her Child in her Parent ego state, but it did not bother him or affect the new liberating feeling in his own Child.


Previous transference transactions were also identified from the phenomenological work without reference to historical memory. When Muniram said to his therapist, "I think I'm embarrassing you by all this,"  $P_2$  projection was occurring (Moiso, 1985, p. 197); when he said to his therapist, "Just get off my back, I'm terrified of you," projective identification of  $P_1$  was occurring; and when he said to his therapist, "I know you understand me better than I understand myself," projective identification of  $P_1 +$  was occurring (Moiso, 1985, pp. 198-199; Woods & Woods, 1982, pp. 290-295).

### Biographical Paradigm

The biography of the Parent ego state belongs to the caretakers in a person's childhood: "That is your Parent" means: "You are now in the same state of mind as one of your parents (or a parental substitute) used to be" (Berne, 1964, p. 24). The biography of the Child ego state contains the events from conception

Biographical Paradigm

(Text, Berne, 1977, p. 146)

Historical Models

(Berne, 1969, p. 111) (Berne, 1961, p. 193)

Figure 4  
From Biographical Paradigm to Historical Models

onward, including developmental milestones or traumas: " 'That is your Child' means: 'The manner and intent of your reaction is the same as it would have been when you were a very little boy or girl' " (p. 24). Although Berne does not speak of the biography of the Adult, his descriptions of the Adult (Berne, 1961, pp. 146, 148; Berne, 1964, p. 27; Berne, 1970, pp. 105, 141) implied that it is not just a capacity but a developing ego state that contains all the learnings, the probability exercises assumed from earlier probability exercises, and the data processing in relation to current reality. The person's accumulation of knowledge and know-how is part of the biography of the Adult as are methods of matching internal drives to external opportunities (Berne, 1970, 1977).

In summing up his discussion of the cowpoke story, Berne wrote that the client recognized in his " 'child' actual attitudes from his earliest childhood, and in the 'parent' actual attitudes of his mother and father, and could pick out the real autonomies which went to make up the 'adult' " (1957b/1977, p. 130).

The biological paradigm gives ego states their historicity and replicability (Figure 4).

The person who stole chewing gum was not called the Child for convenience, or because children often steal, but because he himself stole chewing gum as a child with the same gleeful attitude and using the same technique. The Adult was called the Adult, not because he was playing the role of an adult, imitating the behavior of big men, but because he exhibited

highly effective reality-testing in his legal and financial operations. The Parent was not called the Parent because it is traditional for philanthropists to be 'fatherly' or 'motherly,' but because he actually imitated his own father's behavior and state of mind in his philanthropic activities. (Berne, 1961, p. 34)

The decisive identifying factor in this paradigm is whether or not the ego state can be traced to concrete behavior and attitudes in the past or to present circumstances (Berne, 1961, p. 235).

Berne (1963, p. 130) used biographical criteria in his discussion of the psychic organs: exteropsyche, neopsyche, and archaeopsyche (Figure 4). The psychic organs belong to this paradigm, as Berne (1957b/1977, p. 133, 1958/1977, p. 146) separated one organ from the other on the basis of its historical derivation. The exteropsyche is the past incorporation of parents, the neopsyche is the present, and the archaeopsyche is the past childhood. When Berne (1961, p. 37) used the metaphorical paradigm for the psychic organs, he used the terms only as substitutes for ego states. It is not clear whether Berne regarded the organs as merely logical or as actually existing. At times he used these terms to indicate hypothetical organs that exist behind the ego states (Berne, 1961, p. 240). At other times he used them as adjectives to show that there are exteropsychic ego states, neopsychic ego states, and archaeopsychic ego states (Berne, 1961, p. 245).

If one uses the terms as substitutes for Parent,

Adult, and Child (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 133), then the problem is only one of terminology and not one of metaphysics. Berne (1961, p. 24) credited a previous study (Hinsie & Shatzky, 1940) for the words neopsyche and archaopsychism, and he made reference (Tilney & Riley, 1928) to show that archipallium and neopallium were well-established neurological terms. Therefore, the Parent consists of what is from outside (extero), the Adult of what is new (neo), and the Child of what is ancient (archaeo).

*Historical Models (Figure 4).* The biography of ego states, which emphasizes their derivation, leads to historical models that traditionally have been called second-order structural models. By using the term historical, the intention is to provide an alternative to the use of structural in contrast to functional, as ego state functions also have a historical source and origin. Historical models reveal how much of what we experience as ourselves comes from the past.

The division of the Parent into three parts (Parent in the Parent, Adult in the Parent, and Child in the Parent) and of the Child into three parts (Parent in the Child, Adult in the Child, and Child in the Child) is an example of a historical model as it is based on the history of the Parent and the Child (Berne, 1957b/1977) (Figure 4). Other divisions showing three ego states in mother Parent and three ego states in father Parent (Berne, 1961, p. 193) and further divisions into the grandparents' three ego states (p. 193) are also historical and can be analyzed for therapeutic use even before they are experienced phenomenologically. The ethos and pathos diagram of the Adult is another historical model (Figure 4).

Historical models trace the history of an ego state. The Parent is what is borrowed, the Adult is what is self-made, and the Child is what is brought forward. For example: "When the complete ego state, that is, her total Child, manifested itself in her dreams, it reproduced with little weathering the actual ego state of a real little girl as she existed at 3 p.m. on October 12, 1924" (Berne, 1961, p. 56).

Unlike the id, the Child can be treated and is satiable (Haimowitz & Haimowitz, 1976, p. 12). Historicity in ego state theory brought new possibilities for personality change, for example, when Schiff (1970) came to her insight on reparenting.

It had not made sense to me that the

Parent part of the personality was considered permanent and inflexible. After all, we do change our values even in late maturity. . . . Any structure which was derived from one's environment . . . could perhaps be destroyed and re-established. . . . The Parent could be restructured through therapy based on reparenting the Child. (p. 42)

James's (1977a, p. 492) multiple Parent diagram is another historical model that illustrates the reality of extero psychic additions through therapy (Figure 5). Systematic therapy in the Parent ego state results in changing out-moded imitations, identifications, incorporations, and introjections. Historical models are exemplified in Berne's (1969) standard structural nomenclature (Figure 4), which was a development of previous diagrams (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 132) showing three parts in the Parent and three in the Child, because historically, every parent has three ego states and every child has three ego states. Berne's (1972, p. 116) diagram of the electrode is also a historical model because it puts the historical incorporation of the electrode in childhood as the basis for putting it in the Child ego state. Berne's (1961, p. 193) third-order structural diagram is a historical model that diagrams the historical grandparents and the Adult and Child of the parents.

Berne (1961) admitted that "the examples given are intended only as schematic illustrations or abstractions of what may be seen in the living tissue" (p. 241) when he made the following distinctions, which are the basis for the structural use of the term Adapted Child in the historical model: "The adapted Child is an archaopsychic ego state externally programed, while the natural Child is an archaeopsychic ego state internally programed. The precocious Child may be added for the sake of completeness as the probability programed child" (p. 241). Because Berne (1961, pp. 240-241) connected archaeopsychic with Freud's primary process, neopsyche with secondary process, and extero psychic with identification, the second-order structure of the Child in the historical model may be schematized as follows:

P<sub>1</sub>: The Adapted Child, a kind of  
identification process,  
external

A<sub>1</sub>: The Precocious Child, secondary process, probability

C<sub>1</sub>: The Natural Child, primary process, internal

The reality of these substructures of the Child can be contested. Whereas some TA experts using systems analysis (Peck, 1979) think that they are inferred theoretical constructs (p. 207), others (Haykin, 1980) who treat ego states "as an existential representation of a *mode of functioning*" (p. 361) suggest a maturational scheme in which the child's libidinal energy is cathected to modes of behavior characteristic of each phase. Haykin called the infant at birth the Natural Child; he placed P<sub>1</sub> development—when subject/object separation is possible—at age twelve months, the Little Professor or Adult in the Child at age two, the development of P<sub>2</sub> at age three or four, and significant formation of A<sub>2</sub> after age seven.

In showing how ego state function is an indicator of ego state structure, Haykin disagreed with the classical concept of ego state function. James's (1977b, p. 52) diagram of Adapted Child, Little Professor, and Natural Child is similar to that of Haimowitz & Haimowitz (1976), who followed the Bernian historical model for the structure of the Child ego state in stating that the Adapted Child is trained by the stroke economy to act in certain ways (Figure 5). They hold that the A<sub>1</sub> is retained throughout a person's life. It develops soon after birth and is a "very cute intelligence . . . based on sensation rather than language or logical thinking" (p. 52).

Steiner's (1974, p. 45) diagram of ego states is a historical model that illustrates both structure and function of ego states. Function in this diagram means the quality and capacity of an ego state. For Steiner, Nurturing Parent, Adapted Child, and Natural Child are structural terms.

Schiff et al.'s (1975, p. 25) diagram is another important example of a historical model that details the biographical location of the infant. Holloway (1977, pp. 191, 193) believed that at birth the ego states are all Free Child and highly narcissistic. He held that the development of the A<sub>1</sub> occurs between ages two and eight. Levin (1974/1979) put all the ego states from birth to six months in the Natural Child, six to eighteen months in the Little Professor, and eighteen months to three years in the Adult, whereas the Parent develops during

the time from six to twelve years.

*Case Study Using a Historical Model.* A client said she wanted to work through issues connected with prolonged sexual harassment from an older relative that occurred when she was eight years old. Before beginning the work, the therapist asked her to analyze her Child structure using Berne's diagram of P<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub>, and C<sub>1</sub> being the Parent, Adult, and Child of C<sub>2</sub>. Before reliving the scene she identified her Child structure from historical memory using as follows: P<sub>1</sub> does not support the abuse, yet partly enjoys it; A<sub>1</sub> is a helpless spectator who does not want it repeated but cannot do anything; and C<sub>1</sub> is terrorized and angry.




Figure 5  
Developmental Aspects of Personality

This clarification led to her contract to release the crushing burden of C<sub>1</sub>, to get A<sub>1</sub> to scream and fight back, and to replace the enjoyment P<sub>1</sub> felt with messages for the protection and care of C<sub>1</sub>. She expressed the suppressed screams of C<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>1</sub>, gave up her belief that she was dirty, and decided she was OK and good. The historical model gave a structure for three-chair work between P<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub>, and C<sub>1</sub>: They forgave each other and became friends.

Her historical model served as a basis for




Figure 6  
From Metaphorical Paradigm to Behavioral Models

conceptualizing what she had accomplished in therapy. After completing the first two parts of the contract, the client, sitting on the cushion that represented A<sub>1</sub>, asked the therapist how she could have saved herself. The therapist asked, "What could you have done to keep safe? To whom could you go to get help?" Her newly freed A<sub>1</sub> discovered that she could have locked the door, threatened the relative with exposure, and also told her father.

She made a new decision to value her feelings of repulsion and to act on them, to speak out, and to take action. She identified her C<sub>1</sub> as being free physically in her shoulders and arms, which were previously hunched up. She identified the hunching as beginning from the period of abuse. She reprogrammed A<sub>1</sub>, released C<sub>1</sub>, and reparented P<sub>1</sub>. Berne's second-order historical model helped her to understand her ego states so that she was at peace with what had happened in the past.

**Metaphorical Paradigm**

The metaphorical paradigm emphasizes Berne's (1961) view that Parent, Adult, and Child are modeled after but are not synonymous with parental, adult, and child. Metaphor is used in the same sense in which Mahler (1975) used it to explain symbiosis. Ego states can be better understood by studying their metaphorical counterparts, that is, when we "observe parents acting in their capacity as

parents: adults acting in their capacity as data-processors, and thoughtful and responsible citizens; and children acting like children at the breast, in the cradle, in the nursery, bathroom, and kitchen, and in the school-room and play-yard" (Berne, 1961, p. 75).

The metaphorical paradigm emerged when Berne (1957a/1977) separated the lawyer's Adult from his Child by the quality of thinking he used when gambling.

It is evident that there are two kinds of arithmetic employed here: When he was winning, that of a rational adult; when he was losing, that of a child with an archaic method of handling reality (denial). The taking of the shower represented a lack of confidence on the part of the "child." He did not trust the rational, well-thought-out and rather effective gambling system of the "adult." The shower was part of a primitive, autistic contract the "child" made with the powers of gambling, in order to obtain license to win again. (p. 100)

Figure 6 illustrates how, after having deduced the ego state structure from the behavior and history of the client (as in the cowpoke story), Berne (1963) used inductive generalizations to arrive at the qualities typical of each ego state.

Berne (1957b/1977, p. 136) emphasized the outward manifestation of ego states in the search for ways to diagnose ego states and

developed (Berne, 1961, pp. 71-78) the metaphorical criterion with its behavioral or descriptive aspects when he spoke of the Parent as being prejudicial, prohibitive, arbitrary, and nonrational on the one hand and nurturing and sympathetic on the other (p. 76). These qualities were important for identifying the Parent structure.

The qualities of being aware of reality, organized, adaptable, intelligent, reliable, sincere, and courageous were associated with the Adult. The qualities of being compliant or withdrawing and dominated by Parental influence were indicative of the Adapted Child, whereas the quality of being autonomous, as in rebellion or self-indulgence, was originally seen as indicative of the Natural Child (pp. 77-78). The criterion for differentiating what is Parent, Adult, and Child in this paradigm is metaphorical because the aforementioned qualities are associated with parents, adults, and children, respectively.

The key word in identifying the metaphorical paradigm is "resembles." Therefore, in Figure 6, the words, "parent," "adult," and "child" are used as metaphors for or analogues of Parent, Adult, and Child. Berne (1963) stated:

The ego states of grownups usually fall into one of three classes:

1. Those that resemble the ego state of a parent, i.e., of someone who is acting parentally
2. Those in which the facts offered by the environment are dealt with objectively
3. Archaic ego states that resemble closely those found in infants and young children of various ages (p. 130).

It is significant to note that in dealing with ego states in the metaphorical paradigm, that is, using descriptive aspects as criteria for differentiation, Berne used personality structure and not personality function (1963, p. 130).

*Behavioral Models.* After using the metaphorical or analogical paradigm to separate what is analogous to parental behavior from that which is analogous to grown-up or childlike behavior, we derive behavioral models of ego state models to which the behavioral principle of diagnosis can be applied and from which conclusions can be drawn. For example, we can say that the behaviorally evident spontaneous expression of joy is diagnosed as the reality of

a Child ego state in the behavioral model of ego states, whereas a dogmatic insistence on ritual is behavioral evidence of the reality of a Parent ego state.

Berne (1972) used the words "descriptive functions" (p. 412) to indicate *Rebellious, Adapted, and Natural Child* (Figure 6). He called these "descriptive aspects of personality" (p. 13, Figure 1D) as contrasted to *functional*. Functional aspects of ego states have usually been defined in opposition to structural aspects of ego states (Berne, 1958/1977, p. 146; Joines, 1976, p. 378; McCormick, 1977, p. 14). However, functional aspects of ego state have also been regarded as a part of ego state structure (Capers, 1967, p. 67; McKenna, 1974, p. 22). Porter (1975) stated that the functional/structural division was not clearly defined in the literature and that "functional analysis refers to . . . observable modes of behavior" (p. 272). Peck (1979) stated, "For Berne, *functional* analysis was a way of systematizing *behavioral* observations" (p. 205).

This article proposes that Berne's writings (as described earlier) indicated that mother Parent/father Parent divisions be called historical and Controlling Parent/Nurturing Parent divisions be called behavioral, because both divisions relate to the structure of the ego state. A parallel hermeneutic applies to the Child ego state's historical and behavioral aspects. What came to be called functional is here called a behavioral model.

A behavioral model is empirical because it reveals how ego states can be seen, heard, and described. Behavioral models use qualitative distinctions not only between ego states but also within ego states. The Parent has often been divided into two qualities: one nurturing and the other prejudicial. The Child has sometimes been divided into two qualities, as shown earlier, and at other times into three (Berne, 1972, p. 12). Dusay (1977a, p. 3) divided the Parent into *Critical and Nurturing* and the Child into *Free and Adapted*, with all four having positive and negative dimensions. For Dusay (p. 198), rebellion is a part of adaptation. Kahler (1977, p. 234) had the same divisions for the Parent, but divided the Child into *Adapted and Natural Child*. For Kahler, three of the four divisions have positive and negative aspects. Kahler's contribution was that the *Natural Child* does not have a negative aspect.

The Parent provides restrictions and rules of propriety and can also be affectionate and




Figure 7  
Descriptive Aspects of Personality

sympathetic (Berne, 1970, p. 104). Before Berne (1972) divided Parent behaviors into Controlling and Nurturing states, he (1963) wrote of the Parent having two common forms, nurturing and prejudiced: "The **nurturing Parent** manifests a mothering or protective attitude. The **prejudiced Parent** manifests a set of seemingly non-rational attitudes with a dogmatic or prohibitive tendency" (p. 247). Such distinctions were common in the early days of TA. Steiner and Kerr (1971) divided the Parent into Nurturing and Critical and called the Critical Parent the Oppressive Parent, the Parrot in the Head, the witch, the ogre, or Pig Parent (p. 4). Campos and McCormick (1972, p. 2) referred to the Controlling Parent as the Prejudiced Parent, whereas Porter (1975) called it the Prejudicial Parent, noting that this division is also "sometimes called Critical Parent or Prohibiting Parent" (p. 272).

In contemporary TA the Controlling Parent is frequently seen as giving protection, permission, and structure, whereas the Nurturing Parent gives warmth, comfort, and nourishment. At one time Berne (1961) gave psychobiological reasons for the two forms of the Parent:

The Parent has been described as having two attitudes: nurturing and prohibitive. These attitudes can now be accounted for functionally, where previously their clarification rested on historical data. Their functional explanation depends on whether the concept of a death instinct

is admissible or not. If it is, then both attitudes may be regarded as internally programmed extero-psychic ego states: the nurturing attitude determined by libido, the prohibitive attitude determined by *mortido*. . . . If the death instinct is not admissible, then the nurturing Parent is still internally (e.g., endocrinologically) programmed. (pp. 240-241)

In this context, functional refers to cathexis and libidinal energy and is not opposed to structure. The combination of psychobiological factors with ego state structure is again evident when Berne (1961) continued: "The second-order structure of the Parent, described from the functional rather than the phenomenological point of view" (p. 241) is an active ego state with a combination of " 'like mother when she was nursing me through an illness' (internal); 'like mother when she was arguing about the grocery bill' (probability); 'like mother when she was spanking me' (external, or internal mortitudinal)" (p. 241).

Just as the Parent in these models has different qualities, so does the Child. It is important to separate the meaning of Natural and Adapted in behavioral models from their use in historical models. According to Berne (1961), the natural Child has temper tantrums, whereas the obedient Child is adapted under the Parental influence (p. 42). The Natural Child is either rebellious or self-indulgent and impulsive, and the Adapted Child engages in compliance or avoidance (Berne, 1963, pp. 77-78),



modifying behavior according to the Parental influence, being either compliant or precocious, whining or withdrawing (Berne, 1964, p. 26).

The Natural Child is an important therapeutic metaphor because it emphasizes the beauty, freedom, and spontaneity of the individual: "In the Child reside intuition, creativity and spontaneous drive and enjoyment" (Berne, 1964, p. 27). Berne (1970) wrote of the Child as "the enthusiastic, creative, spontaneous part of the personality, the part that makes women charming and men witty and fun to be with. It is also the part that enjoys nature and people" (p. 117). Although in TA practice there often has been an overemphasis on the innate goodness of the Natural Child, there has been an overly negative approach to the Adapted Child, which has been called the scripty, archaic Child (Boyd, 1978). In fact, some TA experts use Adapted to mean automatic attention-getting behaviors.

Figure 7 illustrates three behavioral models of ego states in which the compliant and rebellious aspects are subsumed under the Adapted Child. Karpman's (1971) section of the diagram shows the Parent as positive and negative, that is, as Prejudiced and Nurturing. Karpman also treated the Adapted Child as both compliant and rebellious. Porter (1975) described positive and negative uses of the Free Child and also wrote of the Adapted Child as being positive and negative, the latter including helplessness and pointless rebellion. Kahler (1977) wrote of positive and negative dimensions in both aspects of the Parent and in the Adapted Child, as well as the positive Free Child (p. 230) or Natural Child (p. 235). These distinctions have an important impact on therapeutic interventions that utilize ego states.

There is a tendency to make each Parent description a separate ego state (Goulding & Goulding, 1979). Even though we use language such as, "My Nurturing Parent said to me," "My Rebellious Child made me do," we are speaking therapeutically when we say that the Nurturing Parent is an ego state in itself. The Nurturing Parent indicates the Parent boundary, but it is not itself the boundary, just as a gale is recognized by the velocity of the wind, but it is not the velocity alone that makes it a gale. Summerton (1992) proposed the colors of the rainbow to refer to the descriptive qualities of ego states. The color is not the structure, but it helps to locate the structure.

In classical TA, the second-order form of behavioral models has been designated (rightly or wrongly) as functional because Berne (1972, p. 412) used the word "descriptive functions" to indicate behaviors of the Child ego state. Functional analysis refers to issues of cathexis (Drego, 1982). When dealing with personality function Berne (1961) wrote about the flow of cathexis, the problem of the real self, and shifts in energy. Summerton (1986b, p. 66) showed that Bernian functional analysis is about energy shifts within ego state boundaries. Dusat (1977b) also kept energy shifts as central to functional analysis. Drego (1986b) formed a grid in which all four models express the *structure* as well as the *dynamics* of ego states (p. 82).

It is in behavioral models that the Adult has been emphasized as resembling a computer, representing the ego state in which one "appraises his environment objectively, and calculates its possibilities and probabilities on the basis of past experience" (Berne, 1972, p. 12). These two aspects of appraisal and calculation give rise to two descriptions for the Adult (Drego, 1979). The first aspect is called Photographic, which indicates the perceiving, appraising, representational, recording, categorizing, and classifying ability of the Adult. The second is called Combining, which indicates the Adult's probability analysis, hypothesizing, option-seeking, weighing of alternative courses of action, valuing, and decision-making abilities (Figure 7). The two represent "the 'adult's' intellectual curiosity and sense of accomplishment" (Berne, 1957b/1977, p. 130). Berne (1970) mentioned two aspects of Adult: "taking in information from the outside world, and deciding on the basis of reasonable probabilities what course of action to take" (p. 105).

Thomson (1974, p. 14) described the Adult as gathering facts and computing objectively. Dolliver and Mixon (1977, p. 170) described the Adult as gathering facts, estimating probabilities, and solving problems. Krumper (1977, p. 298) subdivided the Adult into the content or memory function and the combining associative function. This associative function is subsumed under the aspect of Combining Adult, which fulfills the role of a mediator in the internal environment as well: "The Adult is necessary for survival . . . to regulate the activities of the Parent and the Child, and to




Figure 8  
From Relational Paradigm to Social Models

mediate objectively between them" (Berne, 1964, p. 27).

In behavioral models, the behavior of the Adult ego state includes feelings and ethical behavior. "The Child feels guilty for what he himself has done. The Adult feels guilty for being like those others and for belonging to a race which is capable of doing such terrible things" (Berne, 1966, p. 308). In this model the Adult can be mature and can value actions on the basis of codes and norms that are humanizing without being dogmatic: "In the Adult ethos, indignation at what has been done to other people is permissible" (Berne, 1966, p. 309).

The Adult also has its pleasures behaviorally: "The gratification offered by successful computations of this type afford some of the joys of skiing, flying, sailing, and other mobile sports" (Berne, 1964, p. 27). In addition, the Adult can laugh just as the Child and Parent can laugh (Berne, 1966). The Adult is respectful and trustworthy, committed to fulfilling contracts and talking straight, and able to learn how to drive a car, to know when to call a doctor, and to understand how to keep one's dignity (Berne, 1970, pp. 105, 117).

*Case Study Using a Behavioral Model.* Nine-year-old Arif was swimming in the Talkatora pool when four policemen swam past. Unknowingly they gave him a whack on the shoulder. He felt himself becoming angry, and as he went to the corner of the pool, he twice

hit his toe on the side. He stopped and went over events in his mind using a behavioral model. He remembered that he had been in Adapted Child while dodging and in Rebellious Child when angry and when hitting his toe. He moved to his Adult and said, "I am hurting myself because I am angry with them. I'll express my anger safely." He went into his Nurturing Parent, apologized to his toe, and then decided to spend the rest of his time in Free Child.

### Relational Paradigm

In this paradigm it is the quality of the transaction or the relationship established through the transaction that forms the criteria for differentiating Parent, Adult, and Child: The quality of the social interaction helps the diagnosis of the ego state. "Matthew . . . usually answered like a supercilious parent talking to a backward child" (Berne, 1958/1977, p. 152). The relational paradigm is partially dependent on metaphorical and experiential criteria because the criteria of this paradigm include reference to behavior and to intrapsychic awareness of which ego state in one person is impinging on which ego state in the other. Interpersonal misperceptions are as important—if not more important—than what is perceived in ego state interactions. "Camellia's misperceptions of Rosita's ego state" (Berne, 1958/1977, p. 151) is the beginning of an interactional

process that provides conceptual criteria for separating Camellia's Parent, Adult, and Child.

In fact, one of the most significant moments of ego state encounters between people is the experience of the crossed transaction, which is socially arresting and yet therapeutically important. Certain types of crossed transactions give a clue to structural analysis, that is, to the ego states involved:

This particular type of crossed transaction, in which the stimulus is Adult to Adult, and the response is Child to Parent, is probably the most frequent cause of misunderstandings. . . . Clinically it is typified by the classical transference reaction, which is a special case of the crossed transaction. (Berne, 1958/1977, p. 151)

The relational paradigm separates the sage helper from the victim in search of proving others inadequate by focusing on their personal power dynamics as a gateway to their ego state identification. Figure 8 gives the relational paradigm of dogmatic, companionable, and taunting, indicating the kind of relationship criteria that can be used for structural analysis. The paradigm is taken from the case study of Matthew (Berne, 1958/1977, pp. 147-149). The differences in Matthew's interactions with group members were used to identify his ego states. It was noticed that he had one attitude when talking dogmatically about his wife, another when talking companionably about carpentry with a colleague, and a third taunting attitude toward other group members with "his back ostentatiously turned to the leader" (p. 147).

Figure 8 shows the relationship criteria that led to the diagramming of ego states, as in the case of Clooney (Berne, 1972, p. 384, Figure 19A), who is shown in a dependency relationship from the Child ego state. The paradigm of dominance, mutuality, and positive/negative dependence leads to a variety of social models. Similarly, when Camellia burst into tears saying, "I try so hard, and then you criticize me" (p. 150), the relationship she established with the other person through this behavior enabled their ego states to be "represented structurally" (pp. 150-151) as a Child-Parent interaction.

Structural analysis of ego states led to transactional analysis of ego states, and the treat-

ment proceeded in the context of maneuvers by therapist and client. A client is said to have effectively started therapy when he or she accepts the therapist's Adult instead of his or her own Parent, and the client is cured when she uses his or her own Adult instead of the therapist's Adult (Berne, 1962, p. 10). "Transactionally, this means that when the patient's Child attempts to provoke the therapist's Parent, it is confronted instead by the therapist's Adult. The therapeutic effect arises from the disconcertion caused by this crossed transaction" (Berne, 1961, p. 164). Berne compared this to Alexander and French's (1946) description of the "corrective emotional experience" (Berne, 1961, p. 164), which contrasts the patient's outdated patterns formed as an adaptation to parental behavior to the therapist's objective attitude which conforms to the actualities of the therapeutic situation (p. 164).

The relational paradigm leads the client from transference transactions to societal transactions. Without this paradigm, TA reinforces imbalances of power among people, organizations, groups, nations, races, and sexes. Clients can do beautiful therapy—forming in the process a new Adult, a new Parent, and a new Child—but continue to be hostile to other social groupings and to hold old pathologies in socialized forms.

*Social Models.* Transactional analysis derives its name from social models of ego states which diagram interactions between therapist and client and help clients diagram relationships with others. The technology of TA therapy—that is, contracts, permission giving, and symbiosis—depends on what are here called social models of ego states. What made Berne's work special was his search for the Adult in the client (which he compared to a radio that is not plugged in [1961, p. 235]) and the Adult's capacity to enter into a cooperative relationship with the therapist. The diagramming of ego states in the process of developing this relationship, and the dynamics of dependency and autonomy within it, are the warp and woof of social models.

Social models focus on transactions. Berne's relationship diagram (1970, p. 108) has nine vectors, and each vector's social qualities helps ego state analysis and diagnosis. Companionship is an example of a social model with three parallel vectors in Parent, Adult, and Child,

being a straight-across relationship. Companionship occurs when Parental prejudices are shared, Adult advice is exchanged, and Child fun is enjoyed together (pp. 135-136). Friendship is diagrammed as a social model with four vectors, two emanating from the Adult and two from the Child of each person (pp. 137-139). Berne described intimacy as a Child-to-Child relationship, with the Adult in the background "as an overseer to assure that the commitments and limitations are kept" (p. 139). Love, in its form as eros, is translated into ego states as a Child-to-Child model more primitive than intimacy. Figure 9 shows the social model of admiration and affection, the first being Child-to-Parent in which the Adult gives the "all clear" to the Child, the second being Parent-to-Child warmth (Berne, 1970, p. 121).




Figure 9  
Relational Aspects of Personality  
(Berne, 1970, p. 121)

In classifying various types of relationship, Berne (1970) gave indicators for ego state analysis. In complementary social models Berne diagrammed the relationship of committee members by indicating two Parents, whereas co-workers cooperating was indicated by two Adults. A grievance committee was the social occasion for diagnosing Child ego states. Moralizing is a Parent-to-Parent relationship, negotiating is an Adult-to-Adult one, and commiseration is a Child-to-Child connection. By integrating these relationship aspects with Berne's (1961) quantitative and qualitative

distinctions of ego state interactions, Summer-ton (1979) developed RANJ (relationship analysis instrument), which uses a social model of ego states to identify and change the quality of a particular relationship. Symbiosis, codependency, and hot-potato transactions (English, 1969) are easily described using a social model.

Boyce (1978) suggested a series of social models to indicate different permissions coming from different ego states based on the quality of the permission. In the permission transaction (Berne, 1972), potency and reassurance are seen as Adult-to-Adult relationships, whereas permission and protection are Parent-to-Child and Adult-to-Adult.

Social models were (Berne, 1957a/1977, pp. 106-113) highlighted when Berne played a parental role to fit with the traumatized infant in the client, a kind of reparenting process. In Berne's description of his work with Emily, he attained a clear image of her as an infant. It was his response to that ego image that revealed what the client felt and how the therapist must behave (p. 108). Berne decided he had to play the role of her childhood uncle, who had accepted her unconditionally; in so doing, he supported the transference.

In another case study, Berne (1957a/1977) described how he moved transactionally from relating to a grown-up man to perceiving the small naked child in the client, "writhing inwardly with almost unbearable embarrassment" (p. 103). Berne called this an ego image, and he saw it leading to identification of an ego state because the ego image "functions as an intuitively selected paradigm of the patient's ego fixation" (p. 115).

Ego symbols, such as the "plucked chicken," "a worm," and "a dried up insect" (Berne, 1957a/1977, pp. 113-114), were historically confirmed through an early scene reported from memory. Berne made sure that he was gentle toward the dried insect in the client, even though he could expect to be stung in return. Berne (1955/1977) used the primal images that clients provoked in each other and in the therapist to advance the process of therapy. The primal image "consists of a picture of the patient in some infantile relationship to the psychiatrist" (p. 91). Such a social or transactional model of ego states makes TA therapy what it is.

Social models are useful for assessing the impact one has in social situations and in relationships with one person or a group. For example, if an organization is Parental, an Adult intervention is seen as Child interference, whereas if the organization is Adult, Child humor may be seen as Parental mockery (Berne, 1970). "A playful Child makes Parental committee members even more nervous than a factual Adult does" (Berne, 1970, p. 113).

*Case Study Using a Social Model.* Shalini finished a piece of redecision work in the historical model and accepted her Child with permission to be herself. However, she felt unfinished and fought with her nine-year-old daughter, Tanya. Shalini used the same scripty messages that her mother had given her: "You are no good if you don't study. You must become a lawyer." Using a social model she found she had a relationship of Critic (Parent-Child) and Bolsterer (Parent-Adult) with her daughter and could not go into Comforter (Parent-Child) (Berne, 1970, pp. 272-274).

Shalini used a behavioral model to increase her Nurturing Parent interactions with Tanya, but she was still dissatisfied. She gave herself new messages using a phenomenological model, but she was still harsh with Tanya. Using the relationship analysis instrument (Summerton, 1979) and the relationship diagram, she found herself in Child-Child competition with Tanya, enjoying the girl's helplessness. Shocked at the discovery of this hot potato pressure she was putting on her daughter, Shalini implemented a specific program of intimacy with Tanya. Shalini's contract was to love and to be loved in the Child-to-Child relationship with her daughter. As she did this, she found that her Adult-to-Adult relationship improved remarkably. What had been a painful struggle became a happy friendship. She had used TA for several months, but found that without using a social model she would not have felt the social dimension of TA so keenly and the quality of her family life would not have changed so dramatically.

### Discussion

The paradigms are sentinels that define an ego state as a reality that includes inner feeling and outward behavior. All four help constitute the overall paradigm that is transactional analysis (Drego, 1986a). Diagnosis is possible

once the criteria and models are established. One can diagnose the stern look as Parent once it is established that the Parent does have stern looks. Paradigms and models are epistemologically prior to diagnosis.

There are some simplified models—such as Harris's (1967), which described the Parent as taught, the Adult as thought, and the Child as felt (p. 29); Schiff's (1978) and Klein's (1980), which assigned values to Parent, thinking to Adult, and feelings to Child; and Donovan's (1980), which gave a belief/decision/want diagram of Parent, Adult, and Child. These may be useful pedagogically, but they cause problems in diagnosis.

Such simplified approaches may be useful therapeutically and can be analyzed from the standpoint of the metaphorical paradigm, even though they are untenable in terms of the biographical and experiential paradigms. However, they mislead clients to diagnose all feelings as being from the Child ego state. Dusay (1977b, pp. 38-39) used a similar scheme of values, "here's how," and decisions in describing ego state structure, but he did so in the context of script issues. In this context, we find that Parental values refer specifically to injunctions and counterinjunctions and not to beliefs in general.

*Combining models.* Ego states are usually introduced through a combination of models, with one kind of model as central. Berne (1972) often used a historical model to describe the three ego states (pp. 11-12) with a touch of a behavioral model to bring clarity. Berne (1959)

stated that colloquially, extero psychic ego states are called collectively the Parent. These are replicas of physiological and emotional attitudes and social behavior of parental figures. Neopsychic ego states are collectively called the Adult. These are manifested by objective data processing and an alertness to the outside world of reality, including the psychological reality of other people. Archaopsychic ego states are collectively called the Child. (p. 215)

Here again he used a historical (origins) model as central, with phenomenological (composite) and behavioral (qualities) models as supports to describe ego states.

By using phenomenological and behavioral models in combination, it becomes clear that

not only do all three ego states have feelings, but all three have ways of valuing and thinking: the Parent makes judgments, the Adult assessments, and the Child presumptions (Drego, 1981). Berne (1961, p. 37) considered the Parent to be judgmental in an imitative way, whereas the Adult files information and connects it to previous experience; the thinking of the Child is pre-logical, poorly differentiated, and even distorted. The models can be combined not only for comprehensive understanding of ego state theory, but also for constructing ego state maps for treatment planning (Drego & Summerton, 1988).

When phenomenological models and social models are used in combination, dream work (Drego, 1981), regression work, and reparenting strategies are more effective. This was implied by Berne (1961): "For the best results, it is necessary for the patient to experience the ego state itself, the phenomenological Child" (p. 235). The disturbed phenomenological Child is allowed "to express herself and profit from the resulting constructive experiences" (p. 255), and socially "the ego state can be treated like an actual child. It can be nurtured carefully, even tenderly, until it unfolds like a flower, revealing all the complexities of its internal structure" (p. 226).

The combination of ego state models is also evident throughout the literature. Goulding & Goulding (1979) gave a combined historical and behavioral model for the Parent ego state. English's (1972) forces of spooky, spunky, and sleepy are names for the behavioral qualities of  $P_1$ ,  $A_1$ , and  $C_1$  and as such are also a combination of historical and behavioral models. Haykin (1980) gave a series of historical-phenomenological diagrams that illuminate the pathology of ego state development. Schiff (1969, p. 31) had a diagram that combined phenomenological and behavioral models, and Woods & Woods (1982) gave a combination of phenomenological and historical models for showing  $P_{1-}$  and  $P_{1+}$ . Woollams's (1977, p. 368) diagrams of second-order structural analysis was mainly a historical model with behavioral elements. Summerton (1986a) used Berne's several diagrams of contamination to illustrate ego state model combinations.

In the more recent literature on ego states, Loria (1990, p. 154) stated that because Federn and Berne used metaphorical language and

linear causality, they were reifying metaphors. In this author's opinion, it is not Parent, Adult, and Child ego states that are metaphors, but it is parent, adult, and child that are metaphors for P, A, and C. Another author, Gobes (1990), in her attempt to retrieve the metaphors of ego states, retained the opposition between metaphor and reality. In the epistemology of Wheelwright (1962), we can say that, even as a metaphor, an ego state has a "shy ontological claim" for it "says something however tentatively and obliquely, about the nature of what is" (p. 162). This is in keeping with Zerlin's (1989) "uncertainty-oriented psychotherapy" (p. 84). Clarkson and Gilbert (1988) used the title of their article, "Berne's Original Model of Ego States," to mean "Berne's Original Concept of Ego States" (p. 20) so that for them the term model seems equivalent to the term concept. They refer to the psychic organs as structural and ego states as phenomenological. Although they admit the reality of ego states, they emphasize the fully integrated Adult ego state as a therapeutic goal.

Basing their view of ego states on Berne's psychic organs, Trautmann and Erskine (1981) took a position in which the terms "concept of Parent" and "conceptualization of ego states" (p. 179) seemed to focus on ego states as merely concepts. In their view, what they called the conceptual model of the psychic organs, (namely, extero-psyche, neopsyche, and archaio-psyche) was Berne's basis for ego state theory. Because they regarded their conceptual model as also being a structural model, and because their structural model of values, thoughts, and feelings was also titled phenomenological, they expressed the view that Berne arrived at the structural diagram by the "process of consolidating the conceptual model into the structural model" (p. 180). Summerton (1981) gave a detailed comparison between Drego's work on ego state models (1979, 1981) and Trautmann and Erskine's work (1981).

The criterion used by Erskine (1988) for separating Parent, Adult, and Child is an integration of phenomenological and historical. He distinguished Parent, Child, and Adult on the basis of what is introject, what is archaic, and what is here-and-now: "The Child is created and frozen by early defense mechanisms," whereas the Parent is a "foreign body within the personality . . . an alien chunk

of personality" (p. 17).

Erskine treated Parent and Child contents as defense mechanisms and recommended what, in my opinion, appears to be a one-ego-state-model of autonomy, the Adult, as compared to White's (1988) two-ego-state-model of personality (p. 46). Berne, however, viewed all three ego states as useful and essential parts of the total personality, separate and yet integrated. Many TA traditions worldwide continue in this Bernian tradition today. Goulding (Erskine, Clarkson, Goulding, Groder & Moiso, 1988, p. 12), during the 1988 Chicago panel on ego states, differed with Erskine's view that everything useful and therapeutic has to be integrated as part of the Adult ego state. For example, Goulding strongly resisted the view that current nurturing is in the Adult ego state. In addition, Allen and Allen (1989) spoke of "updating an age-inappropriate historical ego state" (p. 9), that is, of "updating" the Parent ego state, implying that a therapeutic introject can be integrated into the Parent.

*Contracting, Treatment Planning, and Assessment.* Decision making and problem analysis can use the four models concurrently in order to provide a comprehensive approach. The models also provide a checklist for cure by asking a client to describe changes made in all four models. The models are used to ensure that a client's behavioral changes have kept pace with phenomenological ones and vice versa and that the removal of symptoms has coincided with changes in relationships as well as the construction of new autonomies.

A therapist can propose an appropriate model after each session to conceptualize the work done. The models may be used for keeping records before and after therapy, as well as for mapping the route to the construction of new autonomies (Drego & Summerton, 1987). In supervision they are useful for keeping intrapsychic aspects of the supervision distinct from behavioral and social aspects of intervention skills. Summerton (1988) used four models to describe contamination (pp. 42-43), the Parental Flip (pp. 46-48), TA proper (pp. 76-79), and the game "Stupid" (pp. 138-141).

The four kinds of models provide a framework for ego state theory and protocols for diagramming ego states. The key to consistency within a diagram is to ask: What criteria are being used in this diagram?

In the midst of therapy, neither therapist nor client can afford to be rigid about ego state theory. However, before and after therapy we need to have clear epistemological pathways if our ego state concepts on the hot seat are to match our ego state concepts on the blackboard. Berne (1961) used phenomenological, historical, behavioral, and social data when he subdivided the Adult into three areas, expressing one of the goals of transactional analysis psychotherapy:

Transactionally, this means that anyone functioning as an Adult should ideally exhibit three kinds of tendencies: personal attractiveness and responsiveness, objective data-processing, and ethical responsibility; representing respectively archaicopsychic, neopsychic, and extero-psychic elements "integrated" into the neopsychic ego state, perhaps as "influences." (p. 195)

For Berne (1957a/1977, p. 100), ego states were conscious and separable from each other in such a way that they could talk to each other in the present. Although they are derived from the past (1957b/1977, p. 136), they are accessible in the present and changes can be made in all three through decontamination, deconfusion of the Child, permissions, regression analysis, and transactional analysis (Berne, 1961, 1966, 1972). The Child ego state is constructed from past relics but is still experienced as a here-and-now living ego state that is amenable to change. TA therapy can help cathect, decathect, and recathect energy from one ego state to another as well as from one part of the Child (or the Parent) to another part, so that relics of behavior and feeling in the Child (or the Parent), which are obsolete in terms of responding to the present, are restrained. Contemporary TA has a range of interventions by which to achieve cure and wholeness. Boundary work, redecision therapy, self-reparenting, and impasse work primarily use phenomenological models; script analysis and reparenting primarily use historical models; egogram analysis, transactions, and options use behavioral models; and relationship analysis, transference analysis, the permission transaction, and game analysis use social models.

Berne belonged to a generation that wanted a sound theory of knowledge as well as a workable technology. He based his therapeutic

procedures on a theory of personality that is at once conceptually consistent and pragmatically effective. He considered introspective and subjective data valid. Berne's discovery of ego states stands at the intersection of biological science and philosophical analysis. Transactional analysts can therefore treat distinctions between ego states as real and distinctions between their representations as epistemological. Ego state paradigms and models offer a scientific system for the theory of personality and for therapeutic intervention.

*Pearl Drego is a Training and Supervising Transactional Analyst of the ITAA and a Clinical Teaching Member of the TA Society of India (TASI) and the Western Pacific Association of Transactional Analysis. She holds an M.A. in Philosophy and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Bombay. She has served on the Board of Certification and chaired the ITAA's Social Action Committee. Pearl is a founding member of TASI and is currently Vice-President (Ethics). She is founder Director of TACET (Transactional Analytic Centre for Education, Research, and Training), New Delhi. Please send reprint requests to Dr. P. Drego, c/o TACET Academy, 40 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi - 110062, India.*

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